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The Fiji government’s 2008 ‘budget for hope’ rests on some 
fundamental assumptions: political stability, the recovery of key 
sectors of the economy from the effects of the 2006 coup, as well 
as the recovery of the tourism industry, an industry which in the 
past has been resilient to coups. With 34 per cent of the population 
already living below the poverty line, low economic growth could 
push significantly more people into poverty. If the increases in 
global food and fuel prices persist, creating even more difficulties 
for the poor, the prospect of social instability could heighten. In the 
absence of the expected recovery of these key sectors and the loss of 
skilled workers, achieving economic and social recovery will require 
political consensus to resolve the political impasse that has gripped 
the country. The Interim Government also needs to revisit its fiscal 
austerity package.
In launching Fiji’s 2007 Budget, the Interim 
Finance Minister talked about the economy 
swimming or sinking. One year on, the 
question of whether the Fijian economy 
is swimming or sinking lingers. Despite 
a weakening of all key macroeconomic 
indicators and the below-par performance 
of key export sectors, we take a conservative 
stance and conclude that the economy is 
swimming, but in the wrong direction—not 
towards the shore but into deeper water.
The 2008 Budget was called a ‘budget 
for hope’ and the Interim Finance Minister 
described it as follows.
Budget 2008 is moulded on the 
Interim Government’s vision for a 
modern, prosperous and progressive 
multiracial society with equal 
opportunities and a level playing 
field for all. This means providing 
the opportunities to improve living 
standards, providing greater access 
to education for our children, and 
efficient health care facilities for 
our poor, creating more investment 
opportunities and, thereby jobs, 
and empowering our people with 
opportunities and skills to better their 
lives and those of their families (Fiji 
Live, 1 March 2008).
The ‘budget for hope’ rests on some 
fundamental assumptions about the situation 
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in Fiji. First, it assumes that political stability 
will be achieved and that the interim regime 
will pave the way for general elections 
in 2009, as promised. Second, it assumes 
that the key sectors of the economy, such 
as sugar, tourism, construction and retail 
trade, will recover from the debilitating 
effects of the 2006 coup. It was expected 
this recovery would be achieved by early 
2008. These assumptions have proved 
inaccurate, casting doubt on the country’s 
ability to achieve economic growth. The 
tourism industry, which in the past has been 
resilient to coups (Narayan 2004a, 2005, 
2007), has failed to recover. This is evident 
from the fact that the Reserve Bank of Fiji 
(RBF) has revised its initial projection of a 
2.2 per cent growth for 2008 to 1.7 per cent. 
In addition, the contraction of the economy 
in 2007 has been revised to negative 4.4 per 
cent—almost double the initial projection.
Most military coups are justified on the 
grounds that they are replacing corrupt 
regimes, they will clean up corruption 
and pursue consistent, transparent and 
appropriate economic policies to stimulate 
economic growth and fight poverty. It 
is often accepted that non-democratic 
regimes are able to push through unpopular 
yet appropriate economic policies to 
achieve economic reforms that can produce 
sustainable levels of growth. Duncan 
(2007) listed several priorities for the 
Interim Government to pursue in what 
he called an ‘economic clean-up’. These 
included removing customs duty increases 
announced in the Qarase government’s 
2007 Budget, establishing a more effective 
leasehold system for customary land, 
establishing an efficient court system and 
privatising the telecommunications system 
and other inefficient government business 
enterprises.
Fiji has technically had four coups: two 
in 1987, one in 2000 and one in 2006. The 
leaders of each coup stated a particular 
objective: in 1987 and 2000, the motivation 
was to protect indigenous Fijian rights and it 
was claimed that the coup presented the only 
way to move forward. As a result, in 1990, 
Fiji was given a new constitution, which 
was by all measures a racist constitution 
that helped create a divided nation. This 
adversely affected economic growth and 
development (Narayan and Prasad 2007). 
As a result, Fiji lost much highly skilled 
human capital (Narayan and Smyth 2003, 
2005, 2006). The lack of economic progress 
and social distress paved the way for a new, 
non-racist constitution in 1997. With the 
advent of the 1997 Constitution, there was 
a relatively positive economic environment 
and a good foundation was laid for future 
growth. There was significant economic 
growth in the period 1997–99; however, the 
high growth rate of 9 per cent in 1999 was 
due largely to the rebound from the 1998 
drought.
This progress was disrupted by 
another coup, in 2000, instigated using the 
same motivation as the previous coups: 
protecting the rights and economic position 
of indigenous Fijians. At the time, many 
individual Fijian chiefs, the Great Council 
of Chiefs and the military accepted this 
objective. After the 2000 coup, the economy 
declined further and began lagging behind 
many of its Pacific island neighbours, which 
Fiji had dominated (economically and 
socially) since independence.
The Interim Government installed after 
the 2000 coup and the Soqosoqo Duavata ni 
Lewenivanua (SDL) government that came 
to power in the 2001 election continued to 
pursue the objectives of the coup by adopting 
economic policies that put significant 
emphasis on indigenous Fijian economic 
participation. The ‘50/50 by 2020’ policy and 
various other expenditure and affirmative 
action policies were clearly designed to 
please nationalist elements in the society. 
After the 2006 election, however, a genuinely 
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multi-racial cabinet was appointed, and it 
should have been allowed to run its course. 
Even if there was initial doubt about the 
new government, the national mood after 
the formation of the multi-party cabinet 
suggested that people at the grassroots level 
were generally happy. This signal from the 
people gives hope for the future.
It is our view that the majority of the 
people want a political settlement that is 
accommodative and will deliver economic 
prosperity. There is no doubt that the 
2006 coup has been very damaging to the 
economy and to race relations. This, one 
could conclude, is being fuelled by some 
elements in the various groups in opposition 
to the coup as well as by elements within 
the Interim Government. For example, some 
ministers harp on about the failures of the 
SDL government rather than concentrating 
on moving the country forward. No coup, 
whatever the motive, can be good for the 
country and the 2006 coup is no exception. 
Now that the coup has taken place, however, 
and the Interim Government is in charge, 
the main question is how we can move 
forward from here.
First year of the Interim 
Government’s policies and 
achievements: the macroeconomy
The revised 2007 and 2008 budgets were 
touted as the budgets that would save Fiji 
from the economic collapse that had been 
looming for the past five years, and would 
create financial stability. This economic 
assessment was based on the country’s 
weak export performance, dwindling 
foreign reserves and an economy driven 
by consumption expenditure. These issues 
have been discussed widely in the literature, 
so we will not discuss them in much detail 
here.1 The biggest challenge for the Interim 
Government has been to arrest the economic 
decline that began in the aftermath of the 
December 2006 coup.
GDP growth
Generally, Fiji’s real GDP growth rates have 
been very volatile since independence, 
within a range of –6.6 per cent in 1987 to 12.6 
per cent in 1989 (Figure 1). During the 1970s, 
real GDP grew at an impressive average rate 
of 5.6 per cent per annum, while it grew 
at a meagre 1.9 per cent per annum in the 
1980s. During the 1990s, the performance of 
real GDP improved, with the growth rate 
averaging about 2.7 per cent. This growth 
rate was, however, well below the national 
goal of 5 per cent per annum. Unfortunately, 
during the period 2000–06, the performance 
of real GDP deteriorated further, averaging 
only about 2 per cent per annum.
The initial aggregate GDP forecast by 
the government and the Reserve Bank was 
that the economy would contract by 2.5 per 
cent in 2007, compared with growth of 3.6 
per cent in 2005 (RBF 2008). The 2007 growth 
estimate has since been revised several 
times, with the latest revision in April 2008 
estimating negative 4.4 per cent. Assuming 
a population growth rate of 1 per cent, per 
capita GDP in 2007 will therefore have fallen 
by more than 4 per cent.
The 2008 Budget’s GDP forecasts 
were 2.2 per cent for 2008, 1.1 per cent 
for 2009 and 1.6 per cent for 2010. The 
2008 GDP forecast has subsequently been 
revised down to 1.7 per cent (RBF 2008). 
These forecasts are, however, based on 
the assumption that political stability will 
not be an issue and that the timetable for 
a general election in 2009 will be adhered 
to. The expectation that an election will be 
held in 2009 will contribute to the recovery 
of the tourism industry and could assist in 
achieving positive growth rates in 2008, 
2009 and 2010.
Generally, the contribution of the 
primary sector to real GDP growth has been 
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Figure 1  Fiji: real GDP growth rates, 1971–2007 (per cent)
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Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, various years. Fiji Key Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji, Suva.
Figure 2  Fiji: sectoral contribution to real GDP growth, 1971–2007 (per cent)
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declining (Figure 2), while the contributions 
of the secondary and manufacturing sectors 
have been increasing. This trend is due largely 
to the high rate of rural-to-urban migration 
since independence. One of the main reasons 
for this migration has been the expiration 
of agricultural land leases and declining 
agricultural production. The genesis of the 
decline in the contribution of the agricultural 
sector can be traced back to 1987 when the 
then Interim Government pursued a radical 
shift in economic policy, which emphasised 
stimulating urban manufacturing, to be 
led by garment manufacturing. Support 
for the development of rural infrastructure 
and agriculture was reduced substantially, 
contributing to a significant decline in 
agricultural-sector output.
Fiscal policy
The Interim Government’s preference for 
a 2 per cent budget deficit is, in our view, 
a case of ‘feel-good economics’, which is 
counterproductive when all macroeconomic 
indicators have worsened. It is widely 
understood that when an economy is 
in decline, cutting back government 
expenditure will not rein in the decline; 
rather, it will have the opposite effect. In 
the short term, the best strategy would 
have been an economic stimulus package. 
Reducing the budget deficit would have 
been a more realistic longer-term objective; 
but clearly persisting with a 2 per cent deficit 
lacks economic logic and does nothing to 
promote economic growth.2 The result of 
this poor choice in fiscal policy has been 
the deteriorating state of infrastructure and 
the worsening provision of social services, 
which have had a negative impact on 
investor and consumer confidence.
The focus of the Interim Government on 
revenue-raising measures is appropriate and 
must be applauded; however, the amount 
of revenue collected is largely a function of 
economic growth and any revenue-collection 
strategy that impedes economic growth 
will be counterproductive. Government 
Figure 3 Economic growth in Pacific island countries, 2007 and 2008
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action creating instability in the minds of 
investors, such as the case involving Fiji 
Water, is short-sighted and lacks strategy 
and vision. Tax collection must be a process 
in which taxpayers are not harassed and 
in which they feel comfortable paying 
taxes. Any haphazard implementation and 
identification of individuals and companies 
can create a situation of panic and can be 
counterproductive.
Monetary policy
Fiji’s key macroeconomic variables have 
performed poorly in the past couple of 
years. Inflation has increased from about 
3 per cent to more than 8 per cent; total 
national debt now stands at about 55 per 
cent of GDP; foreign reserves have declined 
from a point where they covered six months 
of imports to where they cover only about 
three months of imports; and private 
investment has declined from about 7 per 
cent of GDP to less than 5 per cent.
The RBF’s response to this poor 
macroeconomic performance has been to 
raise interest rates. It raised the official 
interest rate in October 2005 and, in less 
than six months, on 24 February 2006, it 
raised the rate from 2.25 per cent to 3.25 per 
cent. Higher interest rates are a disincentive 
for investment. There is also the growing 
loss of confidence in the economy due 
to speculation about devaluation, which 
also negatively affects investor confidence 
(Narayan and Narayan 2007).
Investment
With a few exceptions (such as in 2000), 
the value of total investment has generally 
shown an upward trend, ranging from 
F$34.8 million in 1970 to F$940.5 million in 
2003 (Figure 4). Total investment includes 
investment by the private sector and by the 
government and statutory bodies.
Similar to real GDP growth rates, 
investment as a share of GDP has been very 
Figure 4  Fiji: total value of investment, 1970–2006 (F$ million)
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Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, various years. Fiji Key Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji, Suva.
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unstable since 1970. On average, during the 
1970s, investment as a share of GDP stood 
at about 22 per cent. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
however, the average share fell to 20 and 17 
per cent, respectively. It picked up slightly 
during the period 2000–06, with an average 
share of about 18 per cent. Private-sector 
investment remains weak and this is likely 
to be the case for the next three years. There 
is potential for increased investment in 
tourism and in commercial non-sugar crop 
sectors. The 2006 coup and the continuing 
political instability have been significant 
set-backs in the drive to increase private 
investment. Private-sector investment needs 
to be increased significantly if Fiji is to 
achieve high, sustained levels of economic 
growth.
While the political environment might 
be less than conducive to foreign investment, 
the Interim Government has made some 
important changes to the foreign investment 
regulations. The changes include removal 
of barriers to investment in certain sectors 
such as bakery and backpacker operations 
(Fiji, Ministry of Information 2008). 
Inflation and the exchange rate
Since the massive hikes in the inflation rate 
in 1973 and 1981 (as a result of global oil 
price shocks), the rate of change in consumer 
prices has showed a general downward 
trend (Figure 6). Some of the major reasons 
for this trend are 
Fiji’s fixed exchange rate regime has 
served as a very good nominal anchor 
for prices
wage demands have been modest
there  has  been  good in f la t ion 
management in Fiji’s major trading 
partner countries
and there have been good supply 
conditions for local produce. 
The official inflation rate provided by the Fiji 
Islands Bureau of Statistics might not reflect 
•
•
•
•
Figure 5  Fiji: investment as a percentage of GDP, 1970–2006
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Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, various years. Fiji Key Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji, 
Suva.
12
Pacific  Economic  BullEtin
Economic  survey
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 number 2 2008 © the australian national university
Figure 6  Inflation rate for Fiji, 1971–2007 (per cent)
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Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, various years. Fiji Key Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji, Suva.
Figure 7  Fiji: nominal exchange rate index, 1980–2006
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Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, various years. Fiji Key Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji, Suva.
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the real inflation rate because the basket of 
goods used to calculate the consumer price 
index (CPI) has not been changed for the 
past 14 years. The Bureau of Statistics should 
consider revising the basket so that it provides 
a better assessment of changes in the CPI.
Broadly speaking, the nominal effective 
exchange rate (NEER) index has been 
trending downwards since 1980, indicating a 
broad depreciation of the domestic currency 
against the basket of currencies to which the 
Fiji dollar is pegged (Figure 7).
The real effective exchange rate (REER) 
index trended downwards from 1980 to 2006 
(Figure 8), signalling an increase in Fiji’s 
international competitiveness. Compared 
with some of its competitors, however, Fiji’s 
real exchange rate might have become less 
competitive.
Sectoral growth prospects
The sugar industry. Sugar exports as a 
percentage of GDP have been declining since 
1995 (Figure 9). This trend is the result of the 
expiration of land leases and the widespread 
non-renewal of leases to the mainly Indo-
Fijian tenants by the Native Lands Trust 
Board (NLTB). In addition, expectations of 
declines in the price paid for sugar exports 
to the European Union, as a result of reforms 
of the preferential treatment of exports from 
developing countries, led many sugarcane 
farmers to leave the industry.
The recent announcement by the 
European Union of a quota for Fijian sugar 
might bring some hope to those still in the 
industry; however, farm-level inefficiency, 
land lease problems and the younger 
generation’s lack of interest in sugarcane 
farming are factors making it unlikely that 
production can be increased.
The biggest concern for the sugar sector 
is the lack of attention from policymakers to 
the real farm-level situation. There are four 
issues that confront the industry at present. 
The first is the impending price decline 
due to the reforms undertaken by the 
European Union in its trade regime. There 
Figure 8  Fiji: real effective exchange rate index, 1980–2006
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Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, various years. Fiji Key Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji, Suva.
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is nothing Fiji can do about this but plan 
for the decline in price. Are we prepared 
for it? All indications are that the cost of 
producing sugar will continue to increase. 
This is evident in rising fuel prices, rising 
fertiliser prices and rising labour costs. The 
second issue of concern is the inefficiency 
of the Fijian sugar mills. This issue could be 
addressed but alone would not resolve the 
decline in the sugar industry. The third issue 
is the impasse over the land lease system, 
unfortunately a major sticking point for the 
whole agricultural sector. How this issue is 
resolved will to a large extent determine the 
future of the sugar industry and the broader 
agricultural sector.
The fourth issue is the lack of interest in 
sugarcane farming. The majority of young 
people are not interested in sugarcane 
farming. Once the current generation in 
the industry passes on, there will be little 
interest in farming sugarcane. Even if the 
land issue is resolved, there will be few 
tenants to take up leases. In this context, it 
is surprising that the Interim Government 
has a plan for an additional mill in Seaqaqa. 
The future for sugar lies in a smaller and 
leaner industry, which could be built on the 
development of efficient mills, sorting out 
the land issue, interesting new farmers in the 
industry and providing incentives to those 
who are already on the farm to remain.
The problems of the sugar industry 
should have been clear to the political leaders 
and industry players for some time. The 
expansion of the sugar industry in the 1970s 
was based not only on the guaranteed price 
and Fiji’s obligations to supply the allocated 
quota but on sales in other markets. In the 
1970s and to a large extent in the 1980s, the 
sugar industry was the leading sector in the 
economy. The deregulation policies pursued 
by subsequent governments led to the 
withdrawal of support and lack of strategies 
to develop the agricultural sector. The 
sugar industry also suffered from the lack 
of attention paid to the agricultural sector 
as a whole and the impact of land tenure 
Figure 9  Fiji: sugar exports as a percentage of GDP, 1995–2006 (per cent)
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Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, various years. Fiji Key Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji, Suva.
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uncertainty on productivity.3 In addition, 
the leaders of the sugar industry failed to 
direct the attention of the government to 
the inefficiencies in the industry and the 
impending erosion of preferential prices. 
While subsequent governments indicated 
plans to restructure the industry, none had 
the political will to implement the plans. The 
need for restructuring was summarised by 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2003:1) 
as follows.
The combination of deteriorating 
world sugar market prices, declining 
efficiencies in all sections of Fiji’s 
sugar sector, and the adverse effects 
of the Master Award which result in 
an inequitable distribution of Fiji’s 
sugar proceeds that does not permit 
reinvestment in the sugar sector’s 
infrastructure, has resulted in a 
situation that dictates an immediate 
restructure of the Fiji sugar sector. 
Without immediate restructuring, 
either the Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) 
will have to cease production due to 
its technical insolvency and declining 
credit rating or the government of the 
Fiji Islands will have to provide an 
immediate cash injection to [the] FSC of 
up to F$33 million to ensure continuing 
operation of the four mills for 2003–
2004. Future annual cash injections can 
be expected to rise as the deteriorating 
sugar sector infrastructure maintenance 
and replacement costs escalate (ADB 
2003:1). 
The ADB’s observation was a timely 
reminder of the need for serious intervention. 
Essentially, that intervention should have 
included
improving the cost effectiveness of 
sugar milling 
ensuring the supply of appropriate 
labour
rationalising sugarcane farm size and 
cane-growing areas
•
•
•
examining the possibilities of raising 
incomes by producing other products 
such as ethanol and the more immediate 
task of producing energy from bagasse 
reducing institutional costs
sugar research development to produce 
improved varieties of sugarcane, bio-
technology research and by-product and 
bio-mass utilisation to raise sugarcane 
yields
resolving the land issue.
In its 2007–11 Strategic Development 
Plan, the SDL government put forward 
its policy objective as being ‘to restructure 
the sugar industry into a commercially 
viable, profitable and sustainable industry’ 
(Fiji 2006:109), and included some of the 
interventions identified earlier. Strategies and 
key performance indicators recommended 
in the plan are shown in Table 1.
These objectives and interventions 
remain relevant even under the present 
Interim Government. The imperatives 
for reform are the same. If we look at 
the key performance indicators, we find 
that time might have all but run out to 
achieve reforms with minimum pain for 
the thousands of people directly dependent 
on the industry. For example, the target of 
raising the yield per hectare by 25 per cent 
by 2011 is optimistic, given that there has 
been no solution to the uncertainty about 
land leases. Targets set for the FSC assume 
that there were no disturbances to the plan 
such as those we have now in the form 
of the military coup. In well-researched 
analysis, Lal and Rita (2005) point out that 
on account of the current level of costs in 
the industry and costs at the farm level, the 
sugar industry faces a serious crisis. They 
conclude with the following. 
Time is running out [for] the Fiji sugar 
industry. In the short term, there will be 
many casualties of trade liberalisation. 
Many cane farmers will lose their 
source of livelihood, and many of 
•
•
•
•
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those who remain financially viable 
will fall below the poverty line. Their 
only salvation will be in finding other 
sources of income. Urban drift will be 
inevitable, placing additional pressure 
on already stretched infrastructure. 
Unless economic and technical 
efficiency are improved, farmers 
will experience a decline in their net 
incomes by one-half to two-thirds. 
Landowners will see a significant 
decline in their rental income. The 
reduction in the incomes of growers, 
cutters, and landowners will have 
flow-on effects in the cane belt and the 
economy as a whole. Urban centres in 
the cane belt, which are mostly reliant 
on sugar revenue, could become ghost 
towns. Unemployment in rural and 
urban areas could be expected to 
increase, as may the social problems 
associated with unemployment (Lal 
and Rita 2005:35).
The conclusions drawn by Lal and Rita 
are similar to those drawn by several other 
studies, including those by global non-
governmental organisations such as Oxfam 
(2005). Figures from the 2007 provisional 
census report and the results from the 2002–
03 Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey show that the urban population 
has increased, together with poverty 
and unemployment, and landowners’ 
incomes have declined; this has given rise 
to associated social ills such as crime.4 The 
situation has been further worsened by the 
political instability since 2000.5
Table 1 2007–11 Strategic Development Plan: strategies and key indicators 
Strategies Key performance indicators
Implementation of sugar industry reform plan
Encourage dialogue and consultation to ensure 
land availability for the industry
Promote milling efficiency and cane quality 
payment system
Improve efficiency and productivity of cane 
production in farms through improved 
extension and research services
Review the cane transportation system with 
the objective of making it cost effective and 
practical
Increase the range of crops produced (including 
aquaculture) in the sugar belt through the 
support of the Alternative Livelihood Project
Design and implement sugar product 
diversification such as ethanol production 
Implement measures to address the social 
impact of the industry restructure
Yield per hectare increased from 61 mega-
tonnes per hectare (Mt/ha) in 2006 to 80 
mt/ha by 2011
TCTS ratio improved from 11 TCTS in 2006 to 
8 TCTS by 2011
Extraction rate of sucrose increased from an 
average of 72 per cent in 2006 to 85 per cent 
by 2011
Reduce milling costs from F$280/Mt raw 
sugar in 2006 to F$140/Mt raw sugar by 2011 
Sale of up to 137 gigawatt hours of electricity 
to the national grid by 2011
FSC return on investment not less than 10 per 
cent and a debt-to-equity ratio of not more 
than 60:40
Returns per farm labour day to remain at least 
at present levels
Monitor school enrolment in sugar belts 
Note: TCTS is tons of sugarcane crushed to produce a ton of sugar. 
Source: Government of Fiji, 2006. 2007–11 Strategic Development Plan, Government of Fiji Islands, Suva:109–10.
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From a macroeconomic perspective, if 
Fiji was to be successful in implementing 
the reforms and following through on the 
sugar adaptation strategy—even though we 
might already be lagging behind—there is 
a possibility that an efficient sugar industry 
could be part of a restructured Fijian 
economy. The danger is, however, that if the 
actions defined in the planned restructuring 
and adaptation strategy are not undertaken 
coherently, we could end up with a lot of 
problems. Achievement of each target is 
important for others to be successful, as all 
are intertwined. A failure of one part of the 
plan could impede other action.
There are highly sensitive social and 
political issues that need to be addressed, 
apart from the implementation, if the sugar 
reform plans are to produce results. Because 
of their historical and ethnic structure, issues 
such as expiring land leases for mainly 
Indo-Fijian tenants and the unwillingness 
of ethnic Fijian landowners to lease land, 
or the controversy about land rents and 
rent arrears, will present special challenges. 
In addition, the social problems and 
compensation for those who want to move 
out of the industry or who are forced out as 
a result of new demands for lower costs at 
all levels will require substantial adjustment 
funds (ADB 2003). Those needing to adjust 
include mill employees, cane cutters and 
inefficient low-production farmers. These 
are all sensitive issues and a transparent 
strategy to deal with them will be vital for a 
harmonious transition of the industry. 
Non-sugar crop sectors. The focus of the 
Interim Government should also be on non-
sugar crops as there is potential for growth in 
this sector, especially if it is geared towards 
exports. Better marketing facilities and 
improvements in quality through improved 
quarantine measures could increase exports. 
In addition, there is an urgent need to 
upgrade rural infrastructure. Commercial 
agriculture presents special potential for Fiji 
but this might require foreign investment. 
Vanua Levu could become a special focus 
for commercial agriculture and the Interim 
Government needs to consider some drastic 
measures to rejuvenate the economy of the 
island. Indeed, the Interim Government 
should consider declaring a tax holiday 
for long-term investment in commercial 
agriculture on Vanua Levu. The island is 
home to 30 per cent of Fiji’s population 
yet it does not feature much in national 
development strategies.
Tourism. Visitor arrival numbers have 
generally been increasing since 1995 (Figure 
9), with the exception of 2000. This increase 
has been due largely to the promotional 
campaigns undertaken in traditional 
markets by the Fiji Visitors’ Bureau.
The tourism industry led Fiji’s rapid 
economic recovery after the 2000 coup. 
Unfortunately, this does not appear to 
have been the case since the 2006 coup. 
In one of its projections, the Fiji Visitors’ 
Bureau expected visitor arrivals for 2008 
to increase to 570,000 from 545,000 in 2007. 
Such an increase does not, however, mean 
that tourism earnings are also increasing. 
According to the Fiji Islands Hotel and 
Tourism Association president, Dixon Seeto, 
the number of tourists conceals the profile 
of the kind of business attracted—that is, 
the length of stay and associated yield. 
According to the Hotel Association and the 
Tourism Action Group (TAG), the majority 
of hotels have been operating on discounted 
rates of 40–50 per cent since the 2006 coup 
(personal communication with the chairman 
of TAG). This means that the tourism 
industry is not likely to generate the growth 
expected by the Interim Government.
Garments. After the coups of 1987, the 
garment sector grew significantly as a 
result of extensive tax concessions and 
the devaluation of the Fijian dollar. The 
influx of foreign and local investors into 
this industry led to the value of production 
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of garments rising from F$2.5 million to an 
estimated peak of about F$188 million in 
2001. By 2001, clothing and textiles accounted 
for about 60 per cent of all production in the 
manufacturing sector and close to 6 per cent 
of GDP. Clothing and textile exports reached 
a peak of F$353 million in 2000 (Figure 11); 
this represented about 31 per cent of the value 
of all merchandise exports, placing them in 
the top three categories of Fiji’s exports. 
A favourable development occurred a few 
years after the first garment manufacturers 
established operations in Fiji. Their growth 
led to the emergence of support and 
‘backward linkage’ industries such as 
weaving and knitting, as well as textile and 
button manufacturing. These new activities 
helped reduce production costs, shortened 
lead times and, in a small way, contributed 
to a more diversified industry.
Since 1998, however, garment exports 
as a share of GDP have generally declined. 
This decline has been caused largely by the 
erosion of preferential access for garments 
to industrialised countries such as Australia 
and the United States. The end of the 13-
year tax holiday given to certain garment 
manufacturers in 2000 and the political 
crisis in the same year did not help. The 
garment industry’s contribution to GDP has 
continued to decline (Figure 12).
Construction industry. The construction 
industry in Fiji has been seriously affected 
by past coups and the situation is no 
different in the wake of the 2006 coup. 
Production in the construction sector as a 
percentage of GDP fell in the period 1999–
2002, reaching a marginal 0.5 per cent in 
2002. This decline was largely a result of the 
adverse effects of the 2000 political crisis. 
Since 2002, however, production has, by 
and large, picked up. In 2006, construction 
as a percentage of GDP was about 6.4 per 
cent (Figure 13).
Figure 10 Fiji: visitor arrivals, 1995–2007
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Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, various years. Fiji Key Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji, Suva.
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Figure 11 Ratio of clothing and textiles industry in the manufacturing sector in Fiji, 
1995–2007 (per cent)
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Figure 12 Fiji: garment exports as a percentage of GDP, 1995–2006
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The charter process and the role of 
the National Council for Building 
a Better Fiji 
The intentions behind the People’s Charter for 
Change are very noble; however, these are 
being confused with the policy actions of the 
Interim Government, and policies seem to be 
at odds with the current national discourse 
on political and economic conditions in 
the country. Discourse is focused mainly 
on the conduct of the next general election 
and the state of the economy. The recent 
increase in food prices and the persistent 
rises in poverty are also serious national 
issues. The Interim Government has not 
been able to build a national consensus to 
ensure that the charter is completed and 
accepted in an inclusive manner. The failure 
to have all parties, including the former 
ruling SDL party, involved in the process 
is a major drawback and could derail the 
whole process.
Apart from the process of adopting 
the charter, the policy directions being 
considered by the National Council for 
Building a Better Fiji (NCBBF) are not new; 
the issues have been raised before and 
have not been resolved. In the consultation 
document for the preparation of the report 
on the state of the nation and the economy, 
several issues are presented as problems, 
including weaknesses in parliamentary 
democracy, particularly as a result of 
constitutional provisions and intransigent 
political attitudes; citizenship, national 
identity, human rights and civil society; 
weak institutions and rules of the game; the 
overly dominant role of government in Fiji; 
inappropriate and/or inconsistent policies; 
the dependency syndrome, especially 
within the indigenous Fijian community; 
untrained leadership at all levels; and poor 
management. There are three national 
task teams, covering good governance; 
growing the economy; and social and 
cultural identity and nation building. All 
Figure 13 Fiji: construction as a percentage of GDP, 1999–2006 (per cent)
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Source: Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, various years. Fiji Key Statistics, Government of the Republic of Fiji, Suva.
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these problems and weaknesses were, 
however, identified previously in national 
development strategies. 
The NCBBF should concentrate on the 
strategies already developed and help in 
their implementation—in particular, the 
institutional changes that are needed to 
remove the distortions in the economy. 
The institutions needing change include 
the judicial system and its operations, rules 
surrounding the operations of markets 
such as commercial laws, banking rules, 
consumer protection laws, and so on. 
While the Interim Government has moved 
to deregulate the telecommunications 
industry—perhaps producing good results 
in the long-term by reducing the cost of 
business—it has not been able to resolve 
many other issues relating to the problems 
of or constraints on growing the economy. 
These include land lease renewals—even 
though the government has made some 
attempt to reform the NLTB and create 
a mechanism for better land utilisation 
through the formation of the Committee 
on Better Utilisation of Land (CBUL). It has 
also not been able to restore the confidence 
of foreign investors and in some ways it 
has impeded the growth of investment. 
The funds allocated to the NCBBF could be 
better used if targeted to the restructuring 
of the economy and implementing some 
of the plans that exist already. This could 
deliver better results for the country in the 
long term. If it includes all opposing parties, 
the NCBBF can be a driver of change and 
could engage in some ‘creative destruction’ 
to remove the historical and institutional 
impediments that are holding Fiji back from 
becoming a prosperous country. It seems, 
however, that the NCBBF is losing steam 
and could end up producing only reports 
and little implementation.
Major policy actions
Resolving land lease problems
The political impasse over land leases has 
been a major challenge in Fiji for the past 
20 years. Since the 1987 coups, the debate 
about land leases has taken on greater 
political significance, as it has become a 
tool for dominance by political parties. 
Indigenous Fijian-based political parties 
and the military in 1987 and 2000 used 
the pretext of protecting indigenous Fijian 
land to build political capital. Indo-Fijian-
based parties have also used land as a 
mechanism for creating political capital. 
Political leaders have ignored many 
serious proposals for resolving the issue 
of agricultural leases. Before the 2006 coup, 
the leader of the Fijian Labour Party and 
the leader of the SDL party failed to discuss 
the land issue and ignored proposals for 
dealing with it. For example, the proposal 
for a ‘master lease’ concept for agricultural 
leases, put forward in 1997, has been 
ignored (Prasad 2006).
Interestingly, the Interim Government 
has set aside F$8 million to pay rental 
subsidies for all agricultural leases from 
July 2008. The Agricultural Landlord and 
Tenant Act (ALTA) provides for a rental 
charge of 6 per cent of the unimproved 
capital value of land. According to the 
NLTB, however, the average rental charged 
is only 5 per cent of the unimproved capital 
value. The rental subsidy to be paid by the 
government is an additional 5 per cent and 
this will take the rental charge to 10 per cent 
of the unimproved capital value. The funds 
could have been better utilised to develop 
the concept of a master lease, whereby 
the NLTB leases agricultural land to the 
government and has all its rent paid by the 
State while the State subleases the land to 
tenants. In this way, the government would 
save some of its subsidy as well as allowing 
22
Pacific  Economic  BullEtin
Economic  survey
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 number 2 2008 © the australian national university
the NLTB to concentrate on other types of 
leases and develop better programs for 
development of non-agricultural land.
Building and improving infrastructure
The state of infrastructure in Fiji has 
deteriorated since the military coups of 1987. 
Fiji has a 20-year infrastructure expenditure 
deficit and it will require significant effort to 
return the current dilapidated infrastructure 
to an acceptable standard. Much of the drag 
on infrastructure expenditure has been 
caused by the lack of a national plan for a 
capital expenditure program in the budgeting 
process and a consistently low budget for 
capital expenditure in budgets since 1987. 
If we had set a target for 30 per cent of total 
expenditure to go to capital works since 
1987, we would have had an annual average 
capital expenditure deficit of about 10 per 
cent. The total capital expenditure for 2007 
was F$1,171.8 million. If we take 10 per 
cent of the 2007 total expenditure, the total 
shortfall for 20 years is F$3.42 billion. This is 
the magnitude of the problem with respect to 
infrastructure and it could take several years 
before we make up this shortfall.
Managing natural resource production
The management of natural resources could 
be improved to maximise their benefits 
to the community. For example, there is a 
need for improvement in the management 
and production of mahogany, which is a 
significant national resource. At present, 
felled mahogany is exported as logs when 
it could add considerably to the economy’s 
growth if it could be processed locally. 
Subsequent governments have failed to 
adopt appropriate policies to promote local 
processing of mahogany so that landowners 
and the government could derive greater 
benefits. The appropriate policy would be 
to adopt a competitive bidding process to 
award the contracts for exploitation of the 
mahogany forests to those investors who have 
the capacity to create value-added mahogany 
products. The Interim Government indicated 
in its 2008 Budget Address that it was going 
to promote downstream processing of 
mahogany to add value.
Regional development
There is a high level of growth inequality 
between Fiji’s two main islands, Viti Levu 
and Vanua Levu. To a large extent, the 
bulk of economic activity, including sugar 
and tourism, is concentrated on Viti Levu. 
In an economy short of investment funds 
and incurring budgetary imbalances for 
a sustained period, the bulk of public 
investment has been channelled to Viti Levu 
to support infrastructure demand. This has 
meant that, due to the under-performing 
economy, Vanua Levu has been largely 
neglected. The result has been migration 
from Vanua Levu to Viti Levu. The bulk of 
the migrants have come to Suva in search of 
job opportunities. 
The rapid increase in Viti Levu’s urban 
population has put excessive pressure on 
urban management. Local governments 
have failed to keep pace with the growing 
demand for social and basic public services. 
The outcome has been a decline in living 
standards in Suva: road conditions are 
poor; water and electricity supplies are 
often disrupted; and, due to the high levels 
of unemployment, the incidence of violent 
robberies has increased alarmingly. The 
government should therefore invest heavily 
in the development and improvement 
of infrastructure to accelerate regional 
development to solve the growing problems 
in urban and peri-urban areas of Viti Levu, 
mainly in and around Suva. The Interim 
Government has sought a loan from the 
Chinese government for this purpose and 
has also indicated its wish for public–private 
partnerships to promote the development 
of infrastructure to overcome its budgetary 
constraints.
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Income tax reform
All macroeconomic indicators in Fiji 
have performed poorly, leading to RBF 
projections of negative economic growth in 
2008. In light of this projection, it is difficult 
to comprehend how policymakers can 
adopt a policy of a 2 per cent budget deficit. 
Policymakers should have considered 
alternative sources of income to fund 
areas (such as infrastructure, regional 
development and social services) that are 
in urgent need of reinvestment. One such 
source of income is income tax. There is a 
need to reform income tax, particularly in 
the higher-income brackets. At a time when 
government budgets are in persistent deficit 
and debt levels are rising, the marginal 
income tax rate for high-income earners 
could be increased or the income level 
at which the highest marginal tax rate is 
effective could be reduced. A thorough 
investigation of this proposal needs to be 
undertaken to ascertain which strategy 
maximises the government’s revenue from 
income tax.
The recent decision by the Interim 
Government to raise the income tax 
threshold from F$9,000 to F$15,000 is a good 
move on two counts. First, it will provide 
relief to some families facing rising fuel and 
food prices. Second, the F$20 million loss in 
tax revenue resulting from this action will 
provide an injection into the economy that 
could boost retail and small businesses. 
The decision by the government to reduce 
duties on some imported food items will 
also provide relief to the poor. The reduction 
in duties is in line with the broad economic 
agenda that Fiji should pursue—to free up 
trade by reducing or eliminating duties on 
imports.
Concluding comments
Fiji’s economy took a nosedive a few years 
before the 2006 coup; the coup further 
weakened the economy. The Interim Finance 
Minister, in the 2007 revised budget and 
2008 budget speeches, emphasised reforms 
to revive the economy. In particular, a 
review of tax policies was undertaken.
The record of the Interim Government 
in achieving these policy reforms has been 
mixed, to say the least. It has not been able 
to reform and contain public expenditure in 
any significant manner. Any savings from 
the reduction of civil service wages and 
salaries have been offset by expenditure 
on the charter process and expenditure on 
the military. The reduction in government 
expenditure through cuts in spending on 
social infrastructure has had an impact on the 
rural poor and the urban working class.
The Interim Government stated that it 
would increase government revenue and 
deliver better services to the people—this has 
not happened. The quality of social services 
in Fiji has declined substantially in the past 10 
years, and remains in a very poor state. There 
have been questions raised about the role of 
the Fiji Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (FICAC) and whether it has been 
able to do anything to reduce corruption. 
The anti-corruption campaigns do, however, 
provide the military government with 
legitimacy among the general population as 
it tries to reveal some of the corrupt practices 
of the past government.
The charter process that the Interim 
Government has put in place is an exercise 
with a very uncertain future. While the 
intentions behind it might be good and 
appropriate for forging a way ahead for 
Fiji, the acceptability and credibility of the 
process among the majority of Fijians is 
ambiguous. The charter’s brief to look at 
every aspect of the country’s problems is 
too ambitious and lacks clarity in its aims 
24
Pacific  Economic  BullEtin
Economic  survey
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 23 number 2 2008 © the australian national university
consensus to resolve the political impasse 
that has gripped the country. Perhaps 
Australia and New Zealand can help in 
speeding up this process of recovery. For 
example, the sanctions imposed should 
be reviewed, especially those in relation 
to travel bans on people who take up 
appointments from the military. A process of 
engagement and dialogue must be pursued 
to save the country from further economic 
decline.
Are we swimming or sinking? Given the 
absence of the expected recovery, the weak 
performance of key sectors of the economy 
and the loss of skilled human capital, Fiji 
might still be swimming, as claimed by the 
Interim Finance Minister. Unfortunately, 
it seems that it is swimming in the wrong 
direction: not towards the shore but towards 
deeper water. The next 12 months will be 
critical.
Notes
1 See, among others, Narayan (2004a, 2004b); 
Narayan et al. (2006, 2007, 2008); Narayan 
and Narayan (2003, 2005, 2007, 2008a, 2008b); 
Narayan and Singh (2007a, 2007b); Narayan 
and Prasad (2003, 2006, 2008); Prasad et al. 
(2007a, 2007b).
2 For a recent analysis of Fiji’s budget deficits, 
see Narayan et al. (2006).
3 See, for example, Prasad and Tisdell (1996, 
2006) for detailed discussion of the impact 
of land tenure on the sugar industry.
4 The 2007 census shows that the urban 
population increased by 61,591 people 
between 1996 and 2006. In addition, it shows 
that the Indo-Fijian population in rural areas 
declined by 36,708 during this time (Fiji 
Islands Bureau of Statistics 2007).
5 See  Narsey (2007)  for  a  report  on 
unemployment and Narsey (2006) for an 
analysis of the 2002–03 Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey.
and objectives. The focus should be shifted 
towards an economic program and long-
term policies for economic growth. Political 
proposals, such as reform of the electoral 
system and changes to the constitution, 
should be dealt with simultaneously in a 
process involving the leaders of the major 
political parties.
All the Interim Government’s projections 
for economic recovery have been off track. 
First, the forecast contraction of the economy 
was off track by almost 100 per cent—that is, 
the original 2007 forecast of a negative 2.5 per 
cent GDP growth was revised to a contraction 
of 4.4 per cent. The forecast growth for 2008 
of 2.2 per cent has already been revised 
downwards to 1.7 per cent. With the prospects 
of growth in sugar and other exports bleak, 
even the forecast growth of 1.7 per cent for 
2008 seems optimistic. If the tourism industry 
does not recover significantly in the next six 
months, we should expect negative GDP 
growth for 2008.
Poor economic growth rates have 
serious implications for the livelihoods of 
the poor. With 34 per cent of the population 
already living below the poverty line, 
depressed economic growth in the next three 
years could push significantly more people 
into poverty. If the increases in global food 
and fuel prices persist, creating even more 
difficulties for the poor, the prospect of 
social instability could heighten.
The Interim Government must therefore 
pay particular attention to the plight of the 
poor while formulating economic policies 
and strategies for recovery. It should not 
pursue a narrow and parochial agenda 
of fiscal austerity and further reduce 
the prospect of growth in the economy. 
More pragmatic fiscal and monetary 
policies would support recovery and boost 
confidence in the economy.
It seems that achieving economic 
and social recovery will require political 
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